Can Words Get in the Way? The Effect of Deliberation in Collective Decision Making by Iaryczower, Matias et al.
Can Words Get in the Way? Supplemental Appendix
Matias Iaryczower
Princeton
Xiaoxia Shi
UW-Madison
Matthew Shum
Caltech∗
August 31, 2016
∗Department of Politics, Princeton University, Princeton NJ 08540; Department of Economics, University
of Wisconsin- Madison, 1180 Observatory Drive, Madison, WI 53706; and Division of Humanities and Social
Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, California 91125. Emails: miaryc@princeton.edu,
xshi@ssc.wisc.edu, and mshum@caltech.edu.
1
Supplemental Material for: Matias Iaryczower, Xiaoxia Shi, Matthew Shum. 2018. "Can Words Get in the Way?  
The Effect of Deliberation in Collective Decision Making." Journal of Political Economy 126(2). DOI: 10.1086/696228. 
A Appendix: Additional Figures and Tables
Table A.1: Summary statistics of data variables
Variable: Mean Std.Dev.
Case characteristics:
FedLaw =1 if case prosecuted under federal law 0.8169 0.3868
Aggravated =1 if crime is aggravated assault/murder 0.1220 0.3273
White Collar =1 if white collar crime 0.2038 0.4029
Theft =1 if crime is theft 0.1414 0.3485
Narcotics =1 if drug-related crime 0.2062 0.4047
Rep. Majority =1 if ≥ 2 republicans on panel 0.4452 0.4971
Female =1 if ≥ 1 female judge on panel 0.0831 0.2760
Harv-Yale Majority =1 if ≥ 2 Harvard/Yale grads on panel 0.1812 0.3853
Jury instruction =1 if main legal issue is jury instruction 0.1970 0.3978
Sentencing =1 if main legal issue is sentencing 0.1624 0.3689
Admissibility =1 if main legal issue is admissibility of evidence 0.3473 0.4762
Sufficiency =1 if main legal issue is sufficiency of evidence 0.2547 0.4358
# cases: 3239
Judge characteristics:
Republican =1 if judge is republican 0.5392 0.4989
Yearsexp Years of experience 7.3174 7.1620
Judexp Years of prior judicial experience 7.1893 7.8409
Polexp Years of prior political experience 1.9197 3.7628
#judges: 523
Vote Outcomes:
Unanimous to Overturn 21.0%
Divided to Overturn 2.8%
Divided to Uphold 4.0%
Unanimous to Uphold 72.2%
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Table A.2: Average Case and Judge Characteristics Across Vote Outcomes
Unanimous 1 Unanimous 0 Divided 1 Divided 0
Case Specific:
FedLaw 0.787 0.832 0.750 0.754
Aggravated 0.124 0.114 0.185 0.208
White Collar 0.179 0.209 0.207 0.238
Theft 0.149 0.137 0.163 0.169
Narcotics 0.166 0.222 0.174 0.154
Rep. Majority 0.446 0.451 0.391 0.377
Female in Panel 0.081 0.082 0.120 0.092
Harvard-Yale Majority 0.168 0.186 0.185 0.169
Jury Instruction 0.168 0.206 0.098 0.254
Sentencing 0.138 0.173 0.087 0.146
Admissibility 0.281 0.362 0.326 0.446
Sufficiency 0.178 0.281 0.196 0.231
Caseload 42.835 44.160 38.357 39.945
Judge Specific:
Republican 0.456 0.472 0.399 0.444
Year of Experience 9.535 9.664 10.210 10.118
Prior Judicial Experience 5.518 5.493 4.902 4.862
Prior Political Experience 1.904 1.825 1.645 2.013
Rep×Assault 0.056 0.053 0.087 0.100
Rep×White Collar 0.085 0.095 0.080 0.115
Rep×Theft 0.058 0.060 0.062 0.044
Rep×Narcotics 0.082 0.118 0.065 0.074
Nonwhite Dummy 0.048 0.040 0.029 0.064
Female Dummy 0.027 0.029 0.040 0.033
Number of Cases: 680 2337 92 130
Note: Unanimous 1: Unanimous Overturn; Unanimous 0: Unanimous Uphold; Divided
1; Divided Overturn; Divided 0; Divided Uphold.
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Table A.3: Benchmark specification
Estimated Vote Probabilities pv(~v|X):
pˆv(111) =0.224 pˆv(000) =0.676
pˆv(101) =0.020 pˆv(010) =0.015
pˆv(110) =0.012 pˆv(001) =0.019
pˆv(100) =0.025 pˆv(011) =0.010
Case characteristics:
FedLaw =1 Jury instruction =0
Narcotics =0 Sentencing =0
Aggravated =0 Admissibility =1
White Collar =1 Sufficiency =0
Theft =0 Rep. Majority =1
Female Judge =0 Harvard-Yale Majority =0
Judge characteristics: Judge 1 Judge 2 Judge 3
Republican 1 1 0
Yearsexp 7.19 0 7.19
Judexp 1.92 0 1.92
Polexp 0 6.85 6.85
Table A.4: Average Judge Characteristics for Dissenting Judges and Non-dissenting
Judges
Dissenting Non-dissenting Difference Standard Error
Republican 0.419 0.466 -0.047 0.034
Years of Experience 10.554 9.650 0.904 0.515
Prior Judicial Experience 5.027 5.465 -0.439 0.496
Prior Political Experience 1.500 1.852 -0.352 0.234
Rep*Assault 0.086 0.056 0.030 0.019
Rep*White Collar 0.104 0.093 0.010 0.021
Rep*Theft 0.059 0.059 -0.000 0.016
Rep*Narcotics 0.063 0.108 -0.045 0.017
Nonwhite Dummy 0.072 0.042 0.030 0.018
Female Dummy 0.041 0.029 0.011 0.013
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Figure A.1: Minimum and maximum probability of error in equilibria consistent with the
data (top) and all equilibria (bottom), for pairs of preference heterogeneity and competence
(H, q) consistent with points in the confidence set for ρ = 0.5. (Average of extrema across
points (~pi, q) such that H(~pi) = H).
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Figure A.2: Minimum and maximum equilibrium probability of error in equilibria consistent
with the data (top) and all equilibria (bottom), for pairs of preference heterogeneity and
competence (H, q) consistent with points in the EIS for ρ = 0.2. (Average of extrema across
points (~pi, q) such that H(~pi) = H).
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Figure A.3: For each point in the EIS, red dots plot the correspondence between the
min/max probability of error in equilibria without deliberation (x-axis) and the min/max
probability of error in all equilibria with deliberation (y-axis). Blue dots plot the correspon-
dence between min/max probability of error in equilibria without deliberation (x-axis) and
the min/max probability of error in equilibria with deliberation consistent with the data.
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Figure A.4: Probability of mistakes with and without deliberation for values of preference
heterogeneity H consistent with points (~pi, θ) in the confidence set for ρ = 0.5 (left), and
ρ = 0.2 (right). Min. and max. eq. probability of error in (i) all equilibria with deliberation
(solid black), (ii) in equilibria with deliberation consistent with the data (dotted), and (iii)
in responsive equilibria without deliberation (solid red, with marker).
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Figure A.5: Estimated Identified set for (pi1, pi2, pi3) with ρ = 0.5 and q = 0.76. Level 0: the
estimated identified set using the original constraints in the paper under the benchmark
specification (38,963 points). Level 1: intersected with 0.5 quantile of CASELOAD; Level
2: intersected with 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 quantiles of CASELOAD; Level 3: intersected with 0.125,
0.25, 0.375, 0.5, 0.625, 0.75, 0.875 quantiles of CASELOAD.
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Figure A.6: Probability of mistakes with and without deliberation for values of preference
heterogeneity H consistent with points (~pi, θ) in the refined EIS for ρ = 0.5. Min. and max.
eq. probability of error in (i) all equilibria with deliberation (solid black), (ii) in equilibria
with deliberation consistent with the data (dotted), and (iii) in responsive equilibria without
deliberation (solid red, with marker).
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Figure A.7: Probability of mistakes with and without deliberation for values of preference
heterogeneity H consistent with points (~pi, θ) in the EIS for ρ = 0.5 (left), based on (left)
an artificial dataset in which all unanimous cases have been discarded and (right) based on
actual data
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B Confidence Set
Here, we discuss statistical inference in partially identified models based on confidence sets
which cover either the true parameter, or the identified set with a pre-specified probability.
Following the literature, we construct a confidence set by inverting a test for the null
hypothesis H0 : (θ, ~pi) ∈ A0 for each fixed (θ, ~pi). To be specific, we collect all the (θ, ~pi) such
that there is one µ ∈ M(θ, ~pi) at which the H0 is not rejected. The collection of all those
(θ, ~pi) forms a confidence set.1
Standard application of the central limit theorem gives us
√
n(~ˆpv − ~pv)→d N(0,Σ), where
Σ is the variance-covariance matrix of the vector of vote probabilities ~pv. Then the law of
large numbers implies Σˆn →p Σ. Accordingly, we define the following test statistic:
Tn(θ, ~pi) = nQn(θ, ~pi; Σˆ
−1
n ). (B.1)
By definition, Tn(θ, ~pi) ≤ nQn(θ, ~pi, µ; Σˆ−1n ) for any (θ, ~pi, µ) ∈ B0. Using standard argu-
ments, we can show that for any (θ, ~pi, µ) ∈ B0, nQn(θ, ~pi, µ, Σˆ−1n ) →d χ2(7). Thus, a test
of significance level α ∈ (0, 1) can use the 1 − α quantile of χ2(7) as critical value. The
confidence set for (θ, ~pi) is defined as
CSn(1− α) = {(θ, ~pi) ∈ Θ× [0, 1]3 : Tn(θ, ~pi) ≤ χ27,α}, (B.2)
where χ27,α is the 1− α quantile of χ2(7).
Theorem 2. Suppose Σ is invertible. Then
(a) lim infn→∞ inf(θ,~pi)∈A0 Pr((θ, ~pi) ∈ CSn(1− α)) ≥ 1− α; and
(b) lim infn→∞ Pr(A0 ⊆ CSn(1− α)) ≥ 1− α.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Remark B.1. Part (a) shows that CSn covers the true value of (θ, ~pi) with asymptotic
probability no smaller than 1 − α. Interestingly, it is also a confidence set that covers A0
with asymptotic probability no smaller than 1−α, as shown in part (b).2 The intuition for
this phenomenon is that the random components of Tn(θ, ~pi, µ) – which are just the empirical
frequencies of the vote probabilities ~ˆp – do not depend on the model parameters (θ, pi).
1This inferential method differs from the approach of Pakes, Porter, Ho, and Ishii (2015), which is based
on moment inequalities derived from agents’ best-response correspondences. While this approach has proved
useful in several applications with games of complete information, in the context of our incomplete informa-
tion environment we have not been able to derive moment inequalities based on best-response behavior.
2 Imbens and Manski (2004) initiated a sizable literature regarding these two types of confidence sets.
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In contrast, in typical moment inequality models, the random sample moment functions
depend explicitly on the model parameters.
Remark B.2. Because the confidence set CSn above is based on the asymptotic critical
value for nQn(θ, ~pi, µ; Σˆ
−1
n ), which is weakly bigger than Tn(θ, ~pi), it may over-cover asymp-
totically; that is, it may be larger than necessary. Tighter and nonconservative confidence
sets can be constructed by directly approximating the distribution of Tn(θ, ~pi) using the
methods developed in Bugni, Canay, and Shi (2013) and Kitamura and Stoye (2011).3 The
disadvantage of doing this is two-fold: (i) the critical value will need to be simulated and
will depend on θ and ~pi; and (ii) a tuning parameter will need to be introduced to reflect the
slackness of the inequality constraints. In addition, in our data, we find that the confidence
set CSn is not much larger than the EIS Aˆn, suggesting that not much can be gained by
adopting the more complicated methods.
The confidence set can be computed in the following steps:
(1) for each (θ, ~pi), compute Tn(θ, ~pi) = nQn(θ, ~pi; Σˆ
−1
n ) via the quadratic program:
Qn(θ, ~pi;Wn) = min
~µ∈[0,1]64
(~pv − Pt(θ)~µ)′W (~pv − Pt(θ)~µ)′
s.t.(3.2), (3.3), (3.4), and
k+8∑
j=k+1
~µj = 1, k = 0, ..., 7. (B.3)
(2) repeat step (1) for many grid points of (θ, ~pi) ∈ Θ× [0, 1]3, and
(3) collect the points in step (2) that satisfy Tn(θ, ~pi) ≤ χ27,α, and the points form CSn(1−α).
For all the results in this paper, we use a value of α = 0.05.
3See Wolak (1989) for the case where the inequality constraints are linear in the structural parameters θ.
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C Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1. Because p(~t, θ) = p(~t|w = 1; θ)ρ + p(~t|w = 0; θ)(1 − ρ) is continu-
ously differentiable in θ, Theorem 2.1 of Shi and Shum (2015) applies and shows that
dH(Bˆn,B0)→p 0, where
Bˆn = {(θ, ~pi, ~µ) ∈ B : Qn(θ, ~pi, µ;Wn) = min
(θ,~pi)∈Θ×[0,1]3
Qn(θ, ~pi,Wn)}, (C.1)
where Qn(θ, ~pi, µ;Wn) is defined like Q(θ, ~pi, µ;W ) but with ~p and W replaced by ~ˆp and
Wn. Because Aˆn and A0 are the projections of Bˆn and B0 onto their first dθ + 3 dimension,
respectively, we have dH(Aˆn,A0)→p 0.
Proof of Theorem 2. (a) For any sequence {(θn, ~pin) ∈ A0}∞n=1, there exists {µn ∈M(θn, ~pin)}∞n=1
such that ~pv = Pt(θn)~µn. Thus, nQn(θn, ~pin, µn; Σˆ
−1
n ) = n(~ˆpv − ~pv)
′
Σˆ−1n (~ˆpv − ~pv)→d X 2(7).
Thus
Pr((θn, ~pin) ∈ CSn(1− α)) = Pr(Tn(θn, ~pin) ≤ χ27,α)
≥Pr(nQn(θn, ~pin, µn; Σˆ−1n ) ≤ χ27,α)
→Pr(χ2(7) ≤ χ27,α) = 1− α. (C.2)
This implies part (a).
(b) Part (b) holds because
Pr(A0 ⊆ CSn(1− α)) = Pr( sup
(θ,~pi)∈A0
Tn(θ, ~pi) ≤ χ27,α)
≥ Pr( sup
(θ,~pi,µ)∈B0
nQn(θ, ~pi, µ; Σˆ
−1
n ) ≤ χ27,α)
= Pr(n(~ˆpv − ~pv)′Σˆ−1n (~ˆpv − ~pv) ≤ χ27,α)
→ Pr(χ2(7) ≤ χ27,α) = 1− α, (C.3)
where the second equality holds because for all (θ, ~pi, µ) ∈ B0, ~pv = Pt(θ)~µ.
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D Responsive Equilibria without Deliberation
In Section 5.4 in the main paper we compared the equilibrium probability of error in voting
with deliberation with the corresponding equilibrium probability of error that would have
occurred in the absence of deliberation for the same court and case characteristics. Specif-
ically, for each point (θ, ~pi) in the confidence set we compare the maximum and minimum
error probabilities across all equilibria, ε(θ, ~pi) and ε(θ, ~pi), and across equilibria consistent
with the data, ε∗(θ, ~pi, pv) and ε∗(θ, ~pi, pv), with the corresponding maximum and minimum
error probabilities in responsive Bayesian Nash equilibria (BNE) of the voting game without
communication, εND(θ, ~pi) and εND(θ, ~pi). To carry out this comparison, we solve for all
responsive BNE of the non-deliberation game, for all parameter points in the confidence
set.
In the game without deliberation, the strategy of player i is a mapping σi : {0, 1} → [0, 1],
where σi(ti) denotes the probability of voting to overturn given signal ti. It is easy to show
that σi(ti) > 0 (< 1) only if Pr(ω = 1|ti, P ivi) ≥ pii (≤ pii), or
Pr(ti|ω = 1)
Pr(ti|ω = 0)
Pr(Pivi|ω = 1)
Pr(Pivi|ω = 0) ≥
pii
1− pii
1− ρ
ρ
(D.1)
Let αiω ≡ Pr(vi = 1|ω) denote the conditional probability that i votes to overturn in state
ω, and note that αi1 = qiσi(1)+(1−qi)σi(0), and αi0 = (1−qi)σi(1)+qiσi(0). Substituting
in (D.1), we have that σi(ti) > 0 only if (for j, k 6= i)
Pr(ti|ω = 1)
Pr(ti|ω = 0)
[
αj1(1− αk1) + αk1(1− αj1)
αj0(1− αk0) + αk0(1− αj0)
]
≥ pii
1− pii
1− ρ
ρ
(D.2)
Under certain conditions (when the court is sufficiently homogeneous) there is an equilibrium
in which all judges vote informatively ; i.e., σi(1) = 1, σi(0) = 0 for all i ∈ N . Note that
with informative voting αi1 = qi, and αi0 = (1 − qi). Then informative voting is a best
response for each i iff
ρ(1− qi)
ρ(1− qi) + (1− ρ)qi ≤ pii ≤
ρqi
ρqi + (1− ρ)(1− qi)
In general, other responsive equilibria are possible. With binary signals and a symmetric
environment (qi = q and pii = pi ∀i ∈ N), the literature has focused on symmetric responsive
BNE. Here the restriction has no bite. Still, there is a relatively “small” class of equilibrium
candidates for any given parameter value. The exhaustive list is presented in Table D.5.
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Table D.5: Types of Possible Responsive Bayesian Nash Equlibria in the Non-deliberation
Game (σj in column σj(t) denotes mixing probability of action t).
Judge i Judge j Judge ` Non-Generic
Eq. Class σ1(1) σ1(0) σ2(1) σ2(0) σ3(1) σ3(0)
Pure Strategies:
(EQ1.a) 1 0 1 0 1 0
(EQ1.b) 1 0 1 0 1 1
(EQ1.c) 1 0 1 0 0 0
All judges mix:
(EQ2) σ1 0 σ2 0 σ3 0
(EQ3) 1 σ1 1 σ2 1 σ3
(EQ4) σ1 0 σ2 0 1 σ3
(EQ5) σ1 0 1 σ2 1 σ3
Two judges mix:
(EQ6.a) σ1 0 σ2 0 1 1
(EQ6.b) σ1 0 σ2 0 0 0 X
(EQ6.c) σ1 0 σ2 0 1 0
(EQ7.a) 1 σ1 1 σ2 1 1 X
(EQ7.b) 1 σ1 1 σ2 0 0
(EQ7.c) 1 σ1 1 σ2 1 0
(EQ8.a) σ1 0 1 σ2 1 1 X
(EQ8.b) σ1 0 1 σ2 0 0 X
(EQ8.c) σ1 0 1 σ2 1 0
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Characterizing responsive equilibria in the non-deliberation game is a laborious but simple
task. We illustrate the main logic in case (8.c) in Table D.5; i.e., σi(1) ∈ (0, 1), σj(0) ∈ (0, 1),
σi(0) = 0, σj(1) = 1, and σk(1) = 1, σk(0) = 0. (The analysis of the other cases is similar;
full details are available upon request). Note that here α10 = (1− q1)σ1(1), α11 = q1σ1(1),
α20 = (1− q2) + q2σ2(0), α21 = q2 + (1− q2)σ2(0), α30 = 0, and α31 = 1.
In equilibrium, i = 1 has to be indifferent between upholding and overturning after t1 = 1.
Then if it exists, σ∗2(0) is given by the value of σ2(0) ∈ [0, 1] that solves (D.2) with equality
for i = 1 and si = 1, or
σ∗2(0) =
[q1(1− pi1)ρ− (1− q1)pi1(1− ρ)][(1− q2)q3 + q2(1− q3)]
(2q3 − 1)[q1(1− pi1)ρ(1− q2) + (1− q1)pi1(1− ρ)q2] ,
which in turn implies α∗20 = (1 − q2) + q2σ∗2(0) and α∗21 = q2 + (1 − q2)σ∗2(0). Similarly, in
equilibrium, i = 2 has to be indifferent between upholding and overturning after t2 = 0.
Then when it exists, σ∗1(1) is given by the value of σ1(1) ∈ [0, 1] that solves (D.2) with
equality for i = 2 and t2 = 0, or
σ∗1(1) =
(1− q2)q3(1− pi2)ρ− q2(1− q3)pi2(1− ρ)
(2q3 − 1)[(1− q2)q1(1− pi2)ρ+ q2(1− q1)pi2(1− ρ)] ,
which implies α∗10 = (1 − q1)σ∗1(1) and α∗11 = q1σ∗1(1). Finally, in equilibrium i = 3 has to
have incentives to vote informatively. This means that
1− q3
q3
≤︸ ︷︷ ︸
t3=1
α∗21(1− α∗11) + α∗11(1− α∗21)
α∗20(1− α∗10) + α∗10(1− α∗20)
· 1− pi3
pi3
· ρ
1− ρ ≤
q3
1− q3︸ ︷︷ ︸
t3=0
.
We can then evaluate numerically, for each point (ρ, ~q, ~pi) in the confidence set, if the
conditions for this to be an equilibrium are satisfied. As before, the error associated with
this equilibrium σ is εND(σ, θ) = (1 − ρ) Pr(v = 1|ω = 0;σ, θ) + ρPr(v = 0|ω = 1;σ, θ),
where given majority rule and independent mixing, for k, ` 6= j
Pr(v = 1|ω, σ, θ) =
3∑
j=1
αkωα`ω(1− αjω) + α1ωα2ωα3ω.
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E Efficient Deliberation
Here we compare social welfare in the equilibria that maximize the sum of judges’ payoffs
with and without deliberation, for equilibria consistent with the data and all equilibria.
For a given point (θ, ~pi), and given a communication equilibrium µ, judge i’s expected utility
is given by the expected cost of type I and type II errors,
Ui(µ; (θ, ~pi)) = − [ρεII(µ; (θ, ~pi))(1− pii) + (1− ρ)εI(µ; (θ, ~pi))pii] .
Therefore, the equilibrium that maximizes judges’ total welfare, µ∗(θ, ~pi), is the µ ∈M(θ, ~pi)
that maximizes U(θ, ~pi, µ) ≡∑i Ui(µ; (θ, ~pi)). A similar definition applies for non-deliberation
equilibria, giving σ∗(θ, ~pi). For equilibria consistent with the data, the equilibrium that max-
imizes judges’ total welfare, µ˜(θ, ~pi), is
µ˜(θ, ~pi) = arg max
µ∈M(θ,~pi)
U(θ, ~pi, µ) s.t. pv(~v) = ∑
~t
µ(~v|~t)p(~t; θ)
 .
The left panel of Figure E.8 plots the maximum aggregate welfare for points in the EIS for
ρ = 0.5 across all equilibria of the game with deliberation, UD(θ, ~pi) ≡ U(µ∗(θ, ~pi); (θ, ~pi)),
and in the game without deliberation, UN (θ, ~pi) ≡ U(σ∗(θ, ~pi); (θ, ~pi)). The difference is
plotted for various levels of competence q, as a function of the degree of preference hetero-
geneity in the court. The plot shows that the gain from efficient deliberation is fairly small,
and concentrated at higher levels of competence and preference heterogeneity. Consider
for example the highest competence level plotted in the figure (q = 0.9). For all levels of
heterogeneity H ≤ 0.8, the change in aggregate welfare attained by introducing efficient
deliberation is smaller than the change in welfare that would result from increasing com-
petence from q = 0.80 to q = 0.90, or from q = 0.70 to q = 0.80. Only at H = 0.9 is the
gain from efficient deliberation relatively high, exceeding the change in welfare that would
result from increasing competence from q = 0.80 to q = 0.90 at low levels of preference
heterogeneity.
The right panel provides a similar comparison restricting to the maximum aggregate welfare
across equilibria consistent with the data, U˜D(θ, ~pi) ≡ U(µ˜(θ, ~pi); (θ, ~pi)). The results are
dramatically different. For relatively homogeneous courts (H ≤ 0.5), aggregate welfare at
the efficient equilibrium without deliberation for a moderate competence level, q = 0.80,
actually exceeds aggregate welfare at the most efficient equilibrium with deliberation that is
consistent with the data at q = 0.90. As the plot shows, the change in welfare is more severe
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at higher levels of competence. In fact, at q = 0.9, the loss of welfare due to deliberation is
larger than the change in aggregate welfare that would result from increasing competence
from q = 0.70 to q = 0.90 in equilibria of voting with deliberation consistent with the data.
A similar analysis can be done for ρ = 0.2. The previous results show, however, that our
previous conclusions do not change when we consider efficient deliberation.
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Figure E.8: Maximum Equilibrium Welfare under Deliberation and No-Deliberation. Solid
lines denote outcomes with deliberation, for ρ = 0.5. Dashed lines denote outcomes with
no deliberation.
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F Refining the Identified Set: Endogenous Quality of Infor-
mation.
In Section 5.5 of the main paper we assumed that CASELOAD affects deliberation but is
independent of the ability q and preference parameters ~pi. This allowed us to refine the
estimated identified set by “intersecting” the estimated identified sets for different levels
of CASELOAD. CASELOAD could, however, potentially affect judges’ signal quality q. If
this were the case, our previous procedure would potentially be too strict and eliminate too
many values of ~pi. To reflect this fact, here we consider the possibility that judges’ signal
quality may depend on CASELOAD, and modify our refinement taking this into consider-
ation. As we will show, provided that preferences ~pi do not depend on CASELOAD, the
revised version of our procedure still provides a significant refinement of the identified set
(IS).
We consider two different exercises:
Exercise 1. First, as long as CASELOAD does not affect the preference parameters ~pi,
then it still makes sense to take intersections over the identified sets of ~pi across different
values of CASELOAD (i.e., ignore the q parameter). We plot the results of this exercise in
Figure F.9.
As the figure shows, the intersection of the identified sets attains a significant reduction
in the size of the identified set for (pi1, pi2, pi3), from 4001 to 1403 points. The refinement
allows us to rule out the most extreme preferences in favor of overturning, increasing the
minimum value of the bias of each judge (the smallest value of the posterior probability
that the lower court’s ruling is erroneous for which judge i would prefer to overturn) from
a value of 0.20 for all judges i = 1, 2, 3 to 0.40 for judge 1, 0.35 for judge 2, and 0.50 for
judge 3. This also implies that we can rule out the most polarized courts in the original
identified set. In fact, the highest level of polarization consistent with the data goes from
1.06 (e.g. ~pi = (0.92, 0.50, 0.08)) in the original EIS to 0.67 (e.g., ~pi = (0.83, 0.50, 0.17)) in
the refined set.
Strikingly, when we plot the projection on ~pi of the identified sets (q-slices of which are
depicted in Figure A.5) obtained in Section 5.5, where we restrict q to also be unaffected
by CASELOAD, the plots in Figure F.9 are exactly the ones that we get. This implies that
there are no difference in the identified sets of preference parameters regardless of whether
we allow for CASELOAD to affect q. The reason for this is that the identified set for ~pi is
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Figure F.9: Level 0 depicts the original EIS of Preference Parameters ~pi. Level 1 depicts the EIS
of preference parameters based on median caseload value, level 2 the intersection of median and 25
and 75 quantiles, and level 3 the EIS of ~pi based on seven quantiles (0.125, 0.25, 0.375, 0.5, 0.625,
0.75, 0.875) of the CASELOAD variable in the data.
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determined at high values of q, and these high values of q are consistent with the conditional
vote profile distribution for all values of CASELOAD.
Exercise 2. For values of q which belong to the identified sets for different CASELOAD
levels, our previous procedure remains valid. That is, even when q depends on CASELOAD:
the fact that q ∈ IS(C ′) and q ∈ IS(C ′′) implies that we cannot rule out the possibility
that two judges having caseload values of C ′ and C ′′ nevertheless have the same value of
q. In this case, then, we can use intersection to refine the set of ~pi consistent with the
data and the given competence level q. Specifically, define the “q-slice” of the identified
set for a value of caseload C, as IS(C; q) = {~pi ∈ [0, 1]3 : (~pi, q) ∈ IS(C)}; i.e, the set
of preference parameters that are consistent with the data for the given level of quality q.
Under the assumption that ~pi does not depend on CASELOAD, if a value of q is in the
identified sets for two different values of CASELOAD, the q-slice of the refined set, IˆS(q),
only contains values ~pi that are in both sets; i.e, if IS(C ′; q) 6= ∅ and IS(C ′′; q) 6= ∅, then
~pi ∈ IˆS(q)⇒ ~pi ∈ IS(C ′; q)⋂ IS(C ′′; q).
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Figure F.10: q-slices of the refined set, IˆS(q), for q = 0.60 and q = 0.90, with successive refinements
as we move from the first to the second and third columns. First column: median; second column:
intersection of median and 25 and 75 quantiles; third column: identified set based on seven quantiles
(0.125, 0.25, 0.375, 0.5, 0.625, 0.7 , 0.875) of the CASELOAD variable in the data.
Figure F.10 plots the resulting q-slices of the refined set, IˆS(q) for q = 0.60 and q = 0.90,
with successive refinements as we move from the first to the second and third columns:
IS based on median CASELOAD level, IS based on intersection of median and 25 and 75
quantiles of CASELOAD, and identified set based on seven quantiles (0.125, 0.25, 0.375,
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0.5, 0.625, 0.75, 0.875) of the CASELOAD variable in the data.4 This allows us to compute
a refined set of polarization consistent with the data for each level of q. The result is
illustrated in Figure F.11.
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Figure F.11: Min and Max Polarization across points in the median IS and Refined IS
A natural question to ask is whether the effect of deliberation we estimate changes once we
use the refined set. The answer is no: qualitatively, the comparison of equilibrium errors
with and without deliberation follow similar patterns to what we described in our main
analysis (Section 5.4). This is illustrated in Figure F.12 below for two levels of competence
(q = 0.80, 0.90) and polarization (H = 0.10, 0.30)
4In practical terms, the results from this second exercise turn out to be very similar to the (unreported)
q = 0.60 and q = 0.90 counterparts of the last three plots of Figure A.5. There is one subtle difference.
Previously we assumed exogeneity of q, and computed identified set based on the average vote profile
distribution (over all values of caseloads). The average made sense because q does not vary with caseloads.
Now that we allow q to depend on caseload, only the conditional vote profile distribution given CASELOAD
make sense and only those are used.
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Figure F.12: Eq. probability of mistakes with and without deliberation, for points in the refined
EIS, at values of preference heterogeneity H and quality of information q consistent with the refined
EIS. ρ = 0.5. Min. and max. eq. probability of error (i) in equilibria with deliberation consistent
with the data (black), and (iii) in responsive equilibria without deliberation (red and green).
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G Common Values Revisited: Results
To address concerns regarding the applicability of our assumptions to some cases in the
sample, in particular “admissibility” cases, we re did our estimation and analysis focusing
on cases where the common value assumption is most natural according to the discussion
in Section 5.5. In this section we report the results of this exercise.
We re-estimate our model (i) for a sample composed of cases other than admissibility cases,
and (ii) for a sample of cases including only sufficiency and sentencing (as well as cases
coded as other). The rationale for considering the restricted samples is to make sure that
the “questionable” cases do not contaminate the estimation of the conditional vote profile
distribution for the type of cases that we now focus on. In the new estimates, we compute
predicted voting probabilities pv(~v|X) for sufficiency cases.
Table G.6 below presents the results. Column (1) presents the predicted voting probabilities
for sufficiency cases using the full sample. Columns (2) and (3) show the corresponding
estimates for our two robustness checks. For ease of comparison, the predicted voting
probabilities for our benchmark analysis is also reported in Column (4). The comparison
of columns (1) and (4) show that predicted vote probabilities for sufficiency cases differ
somewhat from those for admissibility cases, although not radically. Moreover, comparing
column (1) with columns (2) and (3) shows that excluding questionable cases similarly does
not have a large affect on predicted vote probabilities.
Table G.6: Estimated Vote Probabilities pv(~v|X) using different subsamples
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Subsamples Full Only Sufficiency All Except Full
of Cases: Sample & Sentencing Admissibility Sample
pˆv(111) 0.194 0.189 0.169 0.223
pˆv(101) 0.010 0.016 0.014 0.020
pˆv(110) 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.013
pˆv(100) 0.014 0.027 0.023 0.025
pˆv(000) 0.746 0.707 0.743 0.677
pˆv(010) 0.008 0.016 0.012 0.015
pˆv(001) 0.011 0.021 0.015 0.018
pˆv(011) 0.013 0.017 0.016 0.010
Columns (1)-(3): Probabilities evaluated at case characteristics
X = (FedLaw, White Collar, Sufficiency, Rep. Majority)
Column (4): Probabilities evaluated at case characteristics
X = (FedLaw, White Collar, Admissibility, Rep. Majority)
The moderate change in the voting probabilities strongly suggests in turn that the changes
24
in our estimates of the effect of deliberation will also be moderate, but does not imply this
result. To confirm this, we recompute the max and min error probabilities in equilibria with
and without deliberation for the new estimated voting probabilities. We choose the second
column of Table G.6 to redo the error probability calculations with, as this column comes
from a configuration that ex ante differs from the benchmark configuration the most. The
results, which we illustrate in Figure G, indicate that our main conclusions are qualitatively
unchanged.
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Figure G.13: Probability of mistakes with and without deliberation for values of preference het-
erogeneity H and quality of information q consistent with points (~pi, θ) in the EIS for the sufficiency
cases based on the most restricted sample. ρ = 0.5. Min. and max. eq. probability of error (i)
in equilibria with deliberation consistent with the data (black), and (iii) in responsive equilibria
without deliberation (red and green).
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